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During the past 20 years, the central paradigm of nonkin cooper-ation in nonhuman animals has been reciprocal altruism. Triv-
ers (1971) formulated the concept of reciprocal altruism as an inves-
tigation of altruism via turn-taking. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) 
spurred the economic examination of reciprocal altruism by cham-
pioning the concept of Tit for Tat—a strategy of copying your oppo-
nent’s last choice—in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Despite a massive 
theoretical effort investigating the evolutionary stability of the Tit for 
Tat strategy (for review, Dugatkin, 1997), there is little empirical ev-
idence supporting Tit for Tat or reciprocal altruism as a primary ex-
planation for cooperation or altruism, suggesting the need to exam-
ine alternative models (Connor, 1995; Dugatkin et al., 1992; Pusey and 
Packer, 1997; Stevens and Stephens, 2002). Critics of reciprocal al-
truism argue that it is unnecessarily complex. For example, the in-
herent time delay between cooperation and repayment in reciprocal 
altruism makes it difficult to implement. In addition, tracking debts 
owed and favors given requires complex score-keeping that may ex-
ceed the cognitive capabilities of many animal species (Stevens and 
Hauser, 2004). This study is part of a larger effort to understand the 
behavioral constraints on cooperation, and use this understanding to 
develop more plausible alternative models. 
This study extends the study of Clements and Stephens (1995), 
which found that blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata), placed in an iter-
ated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) situation, did not cooperate. They 
did, however, readily cooperate in a simpler mutualistic situation in 
which there was no temptation to cheat. Despite this early lack of ev-
idence for cooperation, recent studies have been more promising. Ste-
phens et al. (2002) did find that the jays can cooperate in an IPD. This 
cooperation, however, only occurred under special circumstances, in 
which the opponent (a trained stooge) used a Tit for Tat strategy and 
the jays’ tendency to discount future rewards was mitigated by accu-
mulating benefits. Therefore, strategic reciprocity and reduced dis-
counting were necessary to maintain cooperation in blue jays. 
We continue to use blue jays as a model system. In an effort to 
test our predictions in a different context, we designed a novel feed-
ing apparatus. Figure 1 shows our design. At the beginning of each 
“play,” food was distributed to six bins in view of, but inaccessible to, 
the players. Each player controlled three of the bins, in the sense that 
one option shifted the three bins to the left, and another shifted them 
to the right. When the bins slid to the left or right, the food within 
them was drawn over openings that distributed the food to one of 
three destinations (Figure 1a). Food in bin 1 distributed food either to 
“self” or to “other,” food in bin 2 distributed food to “other” or to no 
one (“trash”), and food in bin 3 distributed food either to “self” or to 
no one. We could, therefore, control the nature of the game by vary-
ing the amounts of food distributed to each bin. To clarify this, let A1, 
A2, and A3 represent the amounts in bins 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The 
design of the feeding apparatus means that subjects must choose be-
tween delivering amount A1 or A3 to itself; yet, if it chooses A3, it also 
delivers amounts A1 and A2 to its opponent. This creates a game ma-
trix shown in Table 1. 
Consider, for example, a situation in which A1 = 2, A2 = 1, and A3 
= 0. If both players choose “C,” each delivers three units to its oppo-
nent, but if both choose “D,” they both deliver the two units to them-
selves. The amount A2, therefore, represents a cooperative premium, 
that is, the additional value of a cooperative act. On the other hand, 
if the focal player chooses D when its opponent chooses C, it obtains 
five units while its opponent gets nothing. This is, of course, the tra-
ditional prisoner’s dilemma game. 
This design provides the opportunity to explore important con-
ceptual issues in cooperation. The amount in bin 1 (A1) represents the 
classic conflict between selfishness and generosity: should I keep A1 
for myself or give it to another? The amounts in bins 2 and 3 represent 
two different ways of modifying the value of generosity, by making the 
generous act more valuable to the recipient (increasing A2) or more 
valuable to the actor (increasing A3). By comparing situations that 
vary in the presence of a cooperative premium and the temptation to 
defect, we examine the tradeoff between selfishness and generosity. 
Published in Behavioral Ecology 15:2 (2004), pp. 255–261; doi: 10.1093/beheco/arh006   
Copyright © 2004  International Society for Behavioral Ecology; published by Oxford University Press. Used by permission.
Submitted October 7, 2002; revised April 8, 2003; accepted April 23, 2003. 
The economic basis of cooperation:  
Tradeoffs between selfishness and generosity
Jeffrey R. Stevens and David W. Stephens
Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, University of Minnesota, 1987 Upper Buford Circle, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA
Corresponding author — J. R. Stevens
Abstract
The current study examined the economics of cooperation in controlled-payoff games by using captive blue jays, Cyanocitta cristata. This investiga-
tion used a special feeding apparatus to test for the stability of cooperative choice in a series of iterated games. The jays experienced experimentally 
determined game theoretical payoff matrices, which determined the distribution of food to themselves and their opponent, depending on their de-
cision to cooperate or defect. The experiment tested four game matrices, called the cooperate only, defect only, prisoner’s dilemma, and opponent 
control treatments. This study found little cooperation in the defect only and prisoner’s dilemma treatments. Cooperation occurred significantly 
more often in the opponent control treatment. These findings suggest that the jays attend to short-term consequences; they do not cooperate in 
the absence of an immediate benefit (defect only), even if a long-term benefit may exist (prisoner’s dilemma). The opponent control treatment 
suggests that cooperation can occur when an individual’s benefits depend completely on the actions of others; therefore, generosity is cheap. This 
study, therefore, agrees with recent studies in proposing alternative models of cooperation. 
Keywords: blue jay, cooperation, game theory, Pavlov, prisoner’s dilemma, tit for tat
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In this experiment, we test payoff matrices that include no coop-
erative premium and substantial temptation for selfishness (defect 
only), a cooperative premium and a temptation for selfishness (pris-
oner’s dilemma), and a cooperative premium and no temptation for 
selfishness (opponent control). Also, our apparatus allows us to ex-
plore the extreme situation in which cooperative action is the only 
way to obtain food (opponent control). Because the birds’ choices 
determine their opponents’ payoffs and not their own, this treatment 
permits us to study a case of generosity with minimal direct costs to 
the donor. 
Methods
Subjects
We used four pairs of blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) of unknown 
sex and varied age in the experiment (birds 3 and 140, 70 and 85, 4 
and 122, 130 and 208). The within-subjects design of this experiment 
controls for any differences in sex and age. Before the experiment, we 
maintained the jays on a diet of mealworms and Lafeber’s cockatiel 
food, housing them in individual cages (measuring 38 × 38 × 61 cm) in 
a colony of 25. The housing room had an average temperature of 23°C 
with lights on from 0600–2000 h (for further housing information, 
see Clements and Stephens, 1995). 
Apparatus
We used two operant boxes consisting of two adjoining cham-
bers constructed of galvanized sheet metal (61 × 124 × 51 cm) (Fig-
ure 1b). We separated the chambers with transparent Plexiglas par-
titions. We attached the table apparatus (Figure 1a) to both sides 
of the central partition. Each table had a static acrylic base with six 
1-cm holes to which we connected flexible transparent Tygon tubing 
(10 mm inner diameter, 13 mm outer diameter). Each tube led to (1) 
the feeding cup on the same side of the partition, (2) the feeding cup 
on the other side of the partition (by passing through a hole in the 
partition), or (3) an inaccessible but visible Plexiglas “trash bin” at 
the bottom of the partition (Figure 1a). We constructed the top por-
tion of the table from a transparent acrylic “slide” with three 2-cm 
holes (bins) that were offset from the six holes in the base. We con-
nected the slide to a cam attached to a motor. One revolution of the 
motor/cam moved the slide to the right 2.5 cm, back past the cen-
ter to the left 2.5 cm, stopping back at the center of the table. Tygon 
tubes (13 mm inner diameter, 16 mm outer diameter) connected three 
Med Associates 20 mg pellet dispensers to the holes on top of the 
slide. Transparent Plexiglas partitions separated the jays from the ta-
ble, motor, tubes, and feeders. This design allowed each bird to dis-
pense food to itself, its partner, or the trash, depending on its choice. 
Varying the number of pellets dispensed to the bins allowed us to 
create different payoff matrices. 
Each chamber contained three perches (one back and two front 
perches) with microswitches under the crossbars that activated 
when the birds occupied the perches. We attached light emitting di-
odes (LEDs) to the perches (two orange LEDs for the back perches 
and one either red or green LED for the front perches). Light color for 
the C perch (red or green) was counterbalanced between pairs, and 
side for C perch (right or left) was counterbalanced between sub-
jects within pairs. 
A C++ computer program recorded all inputs (microswitches on 
perches) and controlled all outputs (LEDs, pellet dispensers, slide 
motors) via an Alpha Products input/output computer interface sys-
tem. The program controlled the timing of all aspects of the experi-
mental trials. 
General procedure
In this experiment we created a closed economy system in which 
all of the food the jays received resulted from successfully complet-
ing the experimental trials. Therefore, the jays remained in the oper-
ant boxes for 23 h/day, 7 days/week. They were maintained at 80% of 
their normal weight (measured daily) by ensuring a minimum of 7 g 
and a maximum of 10 g of food per day. 
At 0600 h the room lights turned on, and at 0700 h the computer 
program initiated the day’s trials. The trials repeated until 1100 h, 
when we removed the jays from the operant boxes and placed them 
in their home cages for 1 h while we cleaned the operant boxes and 
replenished fresh water. At 1200 h we returned the jays to the exper-
imental boxes, and the trials resumed until 1600 h when the program 
terminated the trials. Overhead lights extinguished at 2000 h. 
Figure 1. (a) Diagram of table apparatus. Pellets from three feeders drop into 
the three transparent food bins. Depending on which perch the blue jay occu-
pied, the top piece slides to the right or left (lower, dark piece remains station-
ary), dropping the pellets into transparent tubes that lead to subject’s own 
food cup (self), the opponent’s food cup (other), or an inaccessible trash bin 
(trash). (b) Diagram of operant conditioning chamber (top view). We placed 
one jay on each side of the box that was separated by a transparent partition. 
Table 1. Payoffs to focal player resulting from opponent’s choice.
  Opponent
Focal player  C (slide table right)  D (slide table left)
 From self  A3  A3
C  From other  A1 + A2  0
 Total  A1 + A2 + A3  A3
 From self  A1  A1
D  From other  A1 + A2  0
 Total  2A1 + A2  A1
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Trials
To initiate a trial, the back perch lights (LEDs) for both sub-
jects illuminated to signal the start of a trial. After both players oc-
cupied the back perches (facing each other), the lights extinguished 
and the feeders dispensed pellets into the appropriate table bins. 
After a 1-s delay, the lights on both subjects’ front perches illumi-
nated. When both players concurrently occupied one of their front 
perches, the lights extinguished and both tables simultaneously 
slid in the direction of the chosen perch (independently for each 
player). For example, if player 1 occupied the perch to its right, or 
“C” perch, the slide on that side of the partition slid to the sub-
ject’s right, so that pellets in bins 1 and 2 went to the other player, 
and pellets in bin 3 went to its own food cup (Figure 1a). Because 
the players faced each other, the right perch represented C for one 
player and D for the other (Figure 1b), and the slide mechanisms 
were mirror images of one another. Thus, if player 2 occupied its 
right perch (opposite from player 1), its table slid to the right, de-
livering the pellets in bin 1 to itself and the pellets in bins 2 and 3 
to the trash bin. Distributing the pellets completed a trial and initi-
ated the 45-s intertrial interval. 
We used forced, or no choice, trials to ensure that the jays experi-
enced the consequences of all possible choice combinations. We ran-
domly assigned 20% of the trials as forced trials, in which we forced 
both birds to make a predetermined choice between C and D. We il-
luminated only one of the two front lights for each of the players and 
required them to land only on the perch with the illuminated light, 
thereby forcing them to face a specific choice combination. This en-
sured that the birds faced all choice combinations, thus reducing the 
possibility of an arbitrary choice. Because no other signals indicated 
a change in treatment, forced trials also accelerated the process of 
learning a new set of payoffs. 
Experimental design
This experiment follows a three-by-three repeated-measures de-
sign, using payoff-matrix treatment and time block as factors. For 
the payoff treatments, we subjected the jays to three test treatments 
and a baseline treatment before each test treatment. Each test treat-
ment lasted for 1700 trials (about 11 days), and the baseline treatment 
lasted until the jays mutually cooperated on at least 75% of the trials 
for three consecutive days. 
Payoff matrices
From this point forward, we will use the terms “cooperate” and 
“defect” to refer to choosing the C and D perches, respectively. By us-
ing the economic definition “joint action for mutual benefit” (Clem-
ents and Stephens, 1995; Dugatkin, 1997), cooperation maps to C in 
all matrices except defect only. We use cooperate and defect to com-
pare the same behavior across treatments, while avoiding the awk-
wardness of the C/D terminology. 
We used a cooperate only treatment as the baseline treatment. 
In this treatment, three pellets dropped in bin 3, allowing the jays 
to receive the pellets if they cooperate and dropping the pellets into 
the trash if they defect, creating the payoff combination in Table 
2a. Because the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) is mutual coopera-
tion, we used this procedure to establish cooperative behavior be-
fore subjecting pairs to any of the test matrices. Game theoretical 
solutions are stability solutions, so by establishing cooperative ac-
tion before a test situation begins, we tested whether cooperation 
persists in a given test situation, as the game theoretical models 
predict. In our experiment, training the jays to land on the C perch 
in the baseline treatment tests the importance of the temptation to 
cheat (D perch) in the prisoner’s dilemma. This procedure also min-
imizes any effects that might “carry-over” from one test matrix to 
the next. 
The test matrices (treatments) included defect only, prisoner’s di-
lemma, and opponent control payoffs (Table 2). 
First, in the defect only treatment, two pellets dropped only in 
bin 1 (A1 = 2, A2 = 0, A3 = 0), so cooperation dispensed all pellets to 
the opponent and defection allowed the player to keep all pellets 
(Table 2b). All defection is both the single game and repeated game 
equilibrium. 
Second, our prisoner’s dilemma treatment was similar to the de-
fect only scenario, except one pellet also dropped into bin 2 (i.e., A1 = 
2, A2 = 1, A3 = 0), where it was dispensed to the opponent if the player 
cooperated or fell into the trash bin if the player defected. The single 
game Nash equilibrium is mutual defection, but Tit for Tat, Pavlov, 
and all defection have been proposed as stable for repeated games. 
Finally, in the opponent control treatment, three pellets dropped 
into bin 2 (A1 = 0, A2 = 3, A3 = 0), which distributed all pellets to the op-
ponent when cooperating and to the trash bin when defecting (Table 
2d). In this treatment, a player could not dispense food to itself but 
was forced to rely on its partner. The single game Nash equilibrium 
is all pairs of pure and mixed strategies, and virtually any strategy is 
stable in repeated games. 
We randomized the order of treatment matrices for each pair of 
birds. In addition, a baseline treatment preceded each test matrix, so 
each pair experienced a series of treatments such as cooperate only–
opponent control–cooperate only–prisoner’s dilemma–cooperate 
only–defect only. 
Time block
We divided the total trials per treatment into three blocks of 
time. We expected a time block effect because it takes time to adjust 
to a new treatment matrix. Therefore, choice behavior in the later tri-
als provided a better estimate of the jays’ preferences. 
Data analysis
By using the S-PLUS statistical package, we conducted repeated-
measures ANOVAs using the arcsine/square-root transformation (to 
Table 2. Payoff matrices used as treatment levels (includes number of pellets 
in table apparatus).
(a) Cooperate only  Cooperate  Defect  A1 = 0
 Cooperate  R = 3  S = 3  A2 = 0
 Defect  T = 0  P = 0  A3 = 3
(b) Defect only  Cooperate  Defect  A1 = 2
 Cooperate  R = 2  S = 0  A2 = 0
 Defect  T = 4  P = 2  A3 = 0
(c) Prisoner’s dilemma  Cooperate  Defect  A1 = 2
 Cooperate  R = 3  S = 0  A2 = 1
 Defect  T = 5  P = 2  A3 = 0
(d) Opponent control  Cooperate  Defect  A1 = 0
 Cooperate  R = 3  S = 0  A2 = 3
 Defect  T = 3  P = 0  A3 = 0
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normalize the data) of the mean proportion of cooperation as our 
response variable. When examining proportion of mutual coopera-
tion (CC), we tested effects within a pair; however, when examin-
ing individual cooperation (C), we tested effects within each sub-
ject nested in pair. We included treatment (defect only, prisoner’s 
dilemma, and opponent control) and time block (one through three) 
as factors. We then conducted Tukey paired comparisons to contrast 
treatment differences. 
Results
Figure 2 gives an overview of the data, showing that defection 
quickly replaced cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and defect 
only conditions. In contrast, mutual cooperation was maintained at 
a relatively high level in the opponent control treatment. Confirm-
ing these observations, a two-factor repeated-measures ANOVA (Ta-
ble 3) on the proportion mutual cooperation indicates highly signifi-
cant treatment effects (ANOVA: F2,6 = 166.09, p <.01) and block effects 
(ANOVA: F2,6 = 11.75, p <.01) but no interaction between treatment 
and block (ANOVA: F4,12 = 1.60, p =.24) (Figure 3). A Tukey paired 
comparison on treatments shows no difference between the propor-
tion mutual cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and defect only 
treatments, but the birds cooperated significantly more in the op-
ponent control treatment than in the prisoner’s dilemma and defect 
only treatments (mean ± SE; defect only: 0.16 ± 0.04; prisoner’s di-
lemma: 0.23 ± 0.04; opponent control: 0.57 ± 0.04). A paired compar-
ison on block suggests that significantly less cooperation occurred 
in the last block compared with the first block pooled over all treat-
ments (mean ± SE; block 1: 0.45 ± 0.05; block 2: 0.31 ± 0.04; block 
3: 0.22 ± 0.04). Because of the 75% mutual cooperation criteria for 
the cooperate only baseline treatment, the birds began all test treat-
ments with a high level of cooperation. Therefore, the block effect 
suggests that the birds began each treatment cooperating but quickly 
defected as they learned the defect only and prisoner’s dilemma pay-
off structure. 
In both defect only and prisoner’s dilemma treatments, the jays 
cooperated less often than expected by chance (25% is the chance 
expectation for mutual cooperation, because if both birds choose C 
50% of the time, we have 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25) in the last third of the tri-
als (mean ± SE; defect only: 0.06 ± 0.03; one-sample t test: μ = 0.25, 
t = −3.56, p =.04; prisoner’s dilemma: 0.05 ± 0.03; one-sample t test: 
μ = 0.25, t = −5.79, p =.01). The jays cooperated above chance lev-
els during the last third of the opponent control treatment (mean 
± SE; 0.54 ± 0.06; one-sample t test: μ = 0.25, t = 3.23, p =.05) (Fig-
ures 2 & 3). 
Strategic analysis
We calculated strategy vectors to explore the finer-scale proper-
ties of the blue jay’s decision rules (Stephens et al., 1997, 2002). These 
vectors represent the probability of cooperating following a previ-
ous payoff. For example, t represents the probability of cooperating 
in the trial after a payoff of T (player defects, opponent cooperates). 
Table 4 illustrates the theoretical strategy vector for a pair of Tit for 
Tat or Pavlov strategists. If two players played Tit for Tat, we would 
expect high t and r values and low p and s values. That is, coopera-
tion should follow previous opponent cooperation (T and R trials). 
Pavlov predicts the “win-stay, lose-shift” strategy, in which players 
will repeat a rewarding choice and switch after a punishing choice 
(Kraines and Kraines, 1989; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). Therefore, 
we would expect high r and p values and low t and s. The blue jays, 
however, diverged from both theoretical strategies. In all three treat-
ments, the jays showed high r and s values but low t and p values 
(Table 4). Rather than following their opponent’s previous choice or 
shifting choices based on reward/punishment contingencies, our re-
sults demonstrate the maintenance of cooperation after cooperation 
and defection after defection. The jays focused on the short-term ben-
efits by reaping the temptation to cheat, T. 
Contingent behavior
Do the jays make choices contingent on their opponent’s behav-
ior? It is quite possible that each jay is acting in isolation of the other 
jay. Given the nature of the apparatus (transparent partition separat-
ing subjects and choice perches facing each other), the jays have ac-
cess to information on the current as well as previous choices made 
by their opponents. There are two ways to test whether they respond 
Figure 2. Graph of each pair’s proportion mutual cooperation (CC) and mu-
tual defection (DD) per day as a function of treatment matrix (solid line in-
dicates mutual cooperation; dotted line, mutual defection). Stable mutual de-
fection occurs in defect only and prisoner’s dilemma treatments, whereas the 
opponent control treatment indicates higher but unstable levels of mutual 
cooperation.
Table 3. ANOVA table for arcsine/square-root transformed proportion mu-
tual cooperation as a function of payoff-matrix treatment and time block. 
Source of variation  df  SS  F  p
Payoff-matrix  2  1.41  166.09  <.01*
Error: pair × matrix  6  .03  —  —
Time block  2  .51  11.75  <.01*
Error: pair × block  6  .13  —  —
Matrix × block  4  .20  1.6  .24
Error: pair × matrix × block  12  .37  —  —
* Statistically significant effects.
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to the behavior of others. First, we can examine how previous oppo-
nent behavior influences current behavior (generalization of strate-
gic analysis proposed above). Second, we examine how the second 
jay to choose modifies its behavior based on its opponent’s choice. 
To test how an opponent’s previous decision influences a sub-
ject’s current behavior, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA 
examining the effect of treatment and opponent’s choice in the previ-
ous trial on individual cooperation, using the last third of the data. As 
expected, treatment influenced cooperation (ANOVA: F2,14 = 24.06, 
p <.01). Interestingly, the jays tended to cooperate more often after 
their opponent’s cooperation (ANOVA: F1,7 = 106.51, p <.01), possibly 
depending on treatment (i.e., a trend for interaction; ANOVA: F2,14 = 
3.41, p =.06). Therefore, the jays do appear to exhibit contingent be-
havior based on the previous trial (Figure 4a). 
To examine how current opponent behavior influences choices, 
we examined order effects. Because the jays could see each other’s 
choices in this experiment, the second bird to choose had the advan-
tage of reacting to its opponent’s choice. Given this knowledge of the 
opponent’s choice, any reaction other than indifference indicates a 
response to the opponent’s behavior. To examine this phenomenon, 
we calculated the probability that each choice was made by the sec-
ond bird after a given choice was made by the first bird, using the last 
third of the data. A repeated-measures ANOVA examined the effects 
of treatment and the choice of the first subject to choose on propor-
tion individual cooperation. We found a significant treatment effect 
(ANOVA: F2,6 = 13.60, p <.01), an effect of first choice (ANOVA: F1,3 = 
27.06, p =.01), but no interaction (ANOVA: F2,6 = 0.97, p =.43). In all 
treatments, the jays appear to respond to cooperation by cooperat-
ing and to defection by defecting even before rewards are dispensed 
(Figure 4b). 
Discussion
Our experiment indicates that the blue jays do not cooperate in the 
prisoner’s dilemma despite ample opportunity and perform no differ-
ently than when no premium for cooperating exists (defect only treat-
ment). Nevertheless, in the absence of a temptation to cheat (opponent 
control treatment), they consistently cooperate. In addition, the jays 
do not use Tit for Tat or Pavlov strategies in any of the treatments, al-
though their behavior is contingent on their opponent’s choices. 
Defect only treatment
The defect only treatment is important because it provides a 
temptation to defect without a cooperative premium (Table 2b): T 
= 4, R = 2, P = 2, S = 0. Mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium. Both 
the prisoner’s dilemma and defect only treatments involve a tempta-
tion to defect; however, the prisoner’s dilemma also includes a coop-
erative premium (Table 2c): T = 5, R = 3, P = 2, S = 0. Recall that the co-
operative premium is simply the additional value of cooperation; in 
our case, one extra food pellet. Therefore, the single-game Nash equi-
librium for the prisoner’s dilemma is again defection; however, the 
cooperative premium has made mutual cooperation more profitable 
than mutual defection. 
This additional unit of benefit has profound theoretical effects 
on choice behavior. Many theorists suggest that the presence of the 
cooperative premium can allow higher level strategies (Tit for Tat, 
Pavlov, etc.) to permit stable cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981; Dugatkin, 1997; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). They would pre-
dict stable defection in our defect only treatment and stable coop-
eration in our prisoner’s dilemma treatment. Our laboratory inves-
tigation of the treatments, however, indicates that the animals do 
not consider these two treatments to be fundamentally different. 
That is, despite its theoretical significance, the cooperative pre-
mium is not functionally important in our experiments. Similar ex-
periments on rats and pigeons also show very low levels of cooper-
ation in these controlled-payoff games (Flood et al., 1983; Gardner 
et al., 1984; Green et al., 1995; Hall, 2003). In fact, the generality of 
this phenomenon is evident by extremely low levels of cooperation 
in prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans, one of the most co-
operative animals (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Baker and Rachlin, 
2001; Rilling et al., 2002). 
One of the primary reasons that animals may ignore the coopera-
tive premium is because they discount the future rewards of playing 
the game and focus on immediate benefits. Theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence reveals that animals may prefer an immediate reward de-
spite higher long-term payoffs for a delayed reward (Benson and Ste-
phens, 1996; McDiarmid and Rilling, 1965). This preference may be 
caused by discounting the value of future rewards that may not mate-
rialize (Kagel et al., 1986; McNamara and Houston, 1987; Stephens et 
al., 1995; Stevens, 2000), although this discounting effect can be over-
come, increasing the probability of cooperation (Baker and Rachlin, 
2002; Stephens et al., 2002). If the jays do discount steeply, they may 
ignore future interactions and play each trial as a one-shot game. 
Figure 3. Graph of mean proportion mutual cooperation (CC) pooled over 
all pairs but separated by payoff-matrix treatment and time block (error bars 
represent standard error; circles indicate defect only; triangles, prisoner’s di-
lemma; and squares, opponent control). In both defect only and prisoner’s di-
lemma treatments, the jays mutually cooperate significantly less often than by 
chance in the last third of the trials. In the opponent control treatment, they 
cooperate more often than by chance (25%). 
Table 4. Transition vectors describing probability of cooperating following 
previous payoffs for Tit for Tat and Pavlov strategies (theoretical predictions) 
and defect only, prisoner’s dilemma, and opponent control matrices (observed 
data). 
 t  r  p  s
Tit for Tat  1  1 0  0
Pavlov 0 1  1  0
Defect only 0.20 0.86  .08 0.58
Prisoner’s dilemma  0.23  0.81  .12  0.67
Opponent control  0.31  0.88  .39  0.83
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Opponent control treatment
The opponent control treatment offers an interesting conflict for 
the jays because the players control the payoffs to their partner rather 
than to themselves. Thus, generosity is cheap because players do not 
pay a cost for cooperating (there is no temptation to defect), but they 
can increase their opponents’ fitness (cooperative premium). We 
find that the jays cooperate more frequently in the opponent control 
treatment than in the prisoner’s dilemma and defect only treatments. 
This result could arise via a number of pathways, and further studies 
are required to distinguish among them. 
First, the temptation to defect is an enormous barrier for cooper-
ation. Once that barrier is lifted, generosity becomes cost-free. Tooby 
and Cosmides (1996) predict that cost-free generosity can evolve 
when organisms can recognize the contingencies of the situations. 
Through simple reinforcement, individuals can act in such a way to 
elicit beneficial behavior from others: “X could increase the frequency 
with which Y emits zero-cost behaviors that incidentally benefit X 
by providing contingent rewards” (Tooby and Cosmides, 1996). Tit 
for Tat is certainly a means of establishing the contingency; however, 
the jays did not use Tit for Tat. Nevertheless, they did demonstrate 
contingent behavior by cooperating after their opponent’s coopera-
tion (Figure 4). Therefore, it is possible that this mutual contingent 
benefit could have maintained cooperation in this treatment. 
Similarly, there could be other benefits associated with cooper-
ation. For example, if group membership is beneficial (via predator 
avoidance, group foraging, cooperative breeding, etc.), cooperation 
may help keep other individuals around, thereby increasing an indi-
vidual’s fitness. These types of group augmentation may play a role 
in the maintenance of groups of birds, lions, and meerkats, among 
other species (Clutton-Brock, 2002; Packer et al., 2001; Woolfenden 
and Fitzpatrick, 1978). Although group augmentation seems particu-
larly powerful in these cheap generosity situations, it remains unclear 
whether the jays received other benefits from cooperating in our ex-
periment. These types of hypotheses could be tested by using asym-
metric matrices, that is, making cooperation differentially advanta-
geous for the two players. 
Second, psychological constraints on animal decision making may 
affect cooperation in this situation. Standard animal learning mod-
els propose an important psychological difference between zero and 
nonzero payoffs (Stephens and Clements, 1998). Animals avoid mak-
ing choices resulting in no reward when the alternate choice yields 
any positive reward. This inherent motivation to avoid zero choices 
could account for the levels of cooperation in our opponent control 
treatment. Again, we predict that a study comparing the current op-
ponent control treatment with one in which we substitute one pellet 
for the zero-pellet payoffs would show a decrease in overall cooper-
ation in the nonzero treatment. Stephens and Clements (1998) pre-
sented jays with a similar matrix (T = 5, R = 5, P = 1, S = 1) and found 
lower levels of cooperation. 
Finally, although mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium in the 
defect only and prisoner’s dilemma treatments, in the opponent con-
trol treatment the equilibrium is all mixed strategies. Nash actually 
described a similar matrix in the original formulation of his equilib-
rium, describing the solution as “all pairs of mixed strategies” (Nash, 
1951). This means that there is a mixed evolutionarily stable strat-
egy (Maynard Smith, 1982) in which all ratios of cooperation to de-
fection (including zero and one) are equilibria—no frequency de-
pendence exists. Therefore, initial probabilities of cooperation will 
remain neutrally stable. For example, individuals that already coop-
erate with kin may maintain cooperation with nonkin because of the 
initial bias. Alternatively, because mutual cooperation Pareto domi-
nates (Binmore, 1992) all other equilibria, we may see elevated lev-
els because no player can be better off outside of mutual cooperation. 
This economic explanation combined with contingent benefits and 
avoidance of zero payoffs probably accounts for much of the cheap 
generosity seen in the opponent control matrix. 
Pavlov
Nowak and Sigmund (1993) advocate a win-stay/lose shift strat-
egy called Pavlov (Kraines and Kraines, 1989), in which the player 
repeats rewarding choices but switches choices after punishing re-
sults. Nowak and Sigmund suggest that Pavlov provides a strategy 
that outcompetes Tit for Tat because it responds better to mistakes 
and is resistant to obligate cooperators. In addition, they offer this 
strategy as a psychologically sound strategy founded on the law of 
effect (Thorndike, 1911). In the prisoner’s dilemma, Nowak and Sig-
mund’s Pavlov strategy considers T and R as “wins” and P and S as 
“losses”. Our opponent control situation represents a strong test of 
the Pavlov strategy, because T and R produce identical wins, whereas 
P and S produce unambiguous and identical losses (no food). 
Figure 4. (a) Graph of mean proportion individual cooperation (C) after the 
opponent’s behavior on the previous trial (error bars represent standard er-
ror). The jays cooperated more if their opponents cooperated on the previ-
ous trial. (b) Graph of mean proportion individual cooperation (C) after the 
choice of the subject that moves first (error bars represent standard error). In 
all treatments, cooperation occurs less frequently after defection by the sub-
ject that moves first.
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Consequently, if Pavlov is a viable mechanism of cooperation, it 
should be employed in our opponent control treatment because the 
players are rewarded for T and R choices and punished for P and S 
choices. Table 4 illustrates the theoretical strategy vector for a Pavlov 
strategist. Examining the strategy vector for our prisoner’s dilemma 
and opponent control treatments indicates low probabilities of coop-
erating after T and high probabilities of cooperating after S. These re-
sults agree with Clements and Stephens’ critique of the Pavlov strat-
egy, in questioning its importance, even in this situation in which it 
is most likely to apply. 
Cheap generosity
The opponent control matrix represents a situation in which gen-
erosity is cheap. Although not stable, cooperation could occur in this 
situation via contingent behavior or Pareto optimality (alternatives 
to cooperation reduce one of the player’s payoffs). This cheap gener-
osity could serve as a precursor to cooperation in more altruistic sit-
uations, providing interesting conceptual implications for the evolu-
tion of cooperation. 
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